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In a journal entry from October 1854 (Pap. XI 2 A 36) Kierkegaard re­
flected metaphorically upon the task of a »Christian accountant« : the sorting 
out of the counterfeit from the valid in Christian faith. 1 Throughout his 
writings, he of course emphatically claimed that his concerns revolved around 
Christian faith and practice. First and foremost, he was a theologian, despite 
contemporary scholarship’s transformation of him into the »father« of 
existentialism. However, as Malantschuk has pointed out, Kierkegaard also 
recognized his intellectual enterprise as one of »anthropological contem­
plation«. (Pap. I ll  A 3, 211)2 In addition to his philosophical and theological 
contributions, he sought to interpret human consciousness and existence and 
it is no exaggeration to observe that his appeal in this century is rooted 
precisely in this anthropological focus. However, his social theory and criti­
cism are only lately being recognized as essential elements of his theological 
vision. Kresten Nordentoft has produced magisterial analyses of Kierke­
gaard’s social and psychological work.3 There are also the Hongs’ new 
translations, and studies by Kirmmse, Deuser, Slok, Elrod and Henningsen.4 
Clearly the richness and complexity of Kierkegaard’s social theory and 
criticism cannot be comprehensively analyzed here. Yet it is possible to out­
line their principal elements and clarify their significance. Thus I will con­
centrate on 1) the social psychology in Kierkegaard’s earlier pseudonymous 
works, 2) the social criticism after 1848 and 3) the fusion of theological 
and social criticism in the years 1848-55. My claim is that his social theory 
and criticism are integral elements of his theological perspectives. Indeed, 
as I see it, the two so converged as to become inseparable. As Slok has 
recently argued, Kierkegaard is one of modernity’s most eloquent Christian 
humanists. I think it is also accurate to reverse this formulation, following 
Berger, to claim that Kierkegaard is one of the most perceptive crafters of 
an inductive, anthropological theology. 5
I. The Grounded Self: Kierkegaard’s Social Psychology
In his early journals and books, Kierkegaard seemed intrigued by the 
methodological possibilities of using literary figures or types such as Faust, 
Ahasuerus and several characters from Mozart operas. These were joined 
by personalities such as Socrates, Abraham and Isaac and by the characters 
and pseudonyms Kierkegaard himself created. While this large, diverse cast 
was employed in a number of ways, a function many seemed to perform 
was that of an »ideal type« in a manner not unlike that of Max Weber. 
Kierkegaard seems to have intended these figures to personify and enact 
different »life views« much like the participants in Socratic dialogues and 
Platonic discussions. It is through these figures that Kierkegaard presented 
much of his social psychology, investigations of the distinctive features of 
consciousness and the development of personality and identity in the process 
of socialization. He also examined the background of institutions and signif­
icant others, the social contexts and relationships in which socialization 
unfolds as well as some of the crises in human development.
In the Judge William-»A« exchanges of Either-Or, the Abraham narratives 
of Fear and Trembling, the dissections of memory, despair, angst and guilt 
in Repetition, The Concept of Anxiety and Stages on Life’s Way and of 
course in the investigation of the self and of sin in The Sickness unto Death, 
Kierkegaard’s social psychology is vividly expressed.6 He recognized that 
every individual is a processual being, constantly developing and changing. 
He underscored the material/biological dimensions as fundamental and in­
terdependent with the other components of human nature. For him the 
individual is always located or grounded within the confines of an array 
of relationships, ranging from those of the biological species to the social 
bonds of the family, church, and nation. Further, the individual is always 
located within history, grounded in time as well as in the timelessness of 
eternity. Judge William particularly emphasizes the self’s definition and 
concreteness in social, political and psychological statuses and roles. (SV II, 
2 3 5 - 6 ) 7  The relationship of the self to the eternal, to God, was paramount 
for Kierkegaard, but his theology was built upon the anthropological found­
ations presented in his early works, the social psychology of the grounded 
self.
Other aspects of his social psychology are expressed in The Sickness unto
Death. The self is depicted as relational, that is, socially constructed and 
dependent. (SV XI, 127-8) Despite its biological, historical and social 
determination, the self is able to reflect upon itself, to think beyond its 
confines, to both accept and reject its present situation and identity. It is 
something of an oversight to note only Kierkegaard’s affirmations of sub­
jectivity, his emphasis on passion and decision. These emphases are for 
him always paralleled by his view of the self’s groundings and thus his 
social psychology is a subtle, dialectical understanding of the relationship 
of self to society. Metaphors of motion and action, the leap, traveling, growth, 
are frequently used to underscore the dialectical relationships of the self to 
the natural world, others and to itself. (SV IV, 236-51; VII, 297; Pap. IV 
C 97; Breve og Aktstykker, nos. 184-6).
Perhaps the strongest assumptions in Kierkegaard’s view concern the 
ethical and religious dimensions. Clearly his theological presuppositions 
distinguish him, at least in relative terms, from later social theorists with 
respect to his view of the self’s creation by and grounding in God. Of 
course Kierkegaard shares important theological perspectives with the domi­
nant theorist of his time, Hegel, despite equally substantial dissent from 
speculative idealism. 8 Nevertheless, particularly with respect to his ethics 
and social criticism there is also kinship between him and later theorists 
such as Weber, Durkheim and Simmel.9 Kierkegaard approaches ethics 
neither from the Kantian nor the Hegelian standpoints. While a good deal 
of Hegelianism echoes in the Judge William letters, there seems to be 
something perfunctory and hollow about the Judge’s concern for Sittlich- 
keit, for adherence to one’s social roles and statuses. Both the disturbing 
diapsalmata at Either-Or s beginning and the sermon at its conclusion inti­
mate as much. (SV I, 3-27; II, 303-18)10 While the ordinary, »universal« 
or normative forms of existence and their ethical demands are acknowledged, 
Kierkegaard, like the later social theorists, also recognized the precariousness 
of social reality. He perceived the inherent chaos beneath the surface of 
society and consciousness, »dark abysses«, as Durkheim would later call 
them. Further, Kierkegaard noted possibilities other than esthetic angst, 
despair and anomie, namely that one could become empty, in ethical and 
religious terms, caught in »spiritlessness«. (Aandbshed) The bourgeois 
(Spidsborgere) were particular targets in this respect. (SV II, 152-61, 307- 
18; III, 61-73, 86-93, 105, 117-30; IV, 323-49, 363-7; VI, 87-174; VII, 
476-7; XI, 150-60)11
So it is inaccurate to judge Kierkegaard as insensitive towards social 
structure and history as some have done. In the years up to 1848 his social 
psychology unmistakably grounds the self in society and history. When he 
turned to social criticism, Kierkegaard made it clear that modernity was not 
just a time of spiritual disintegration but also one of political crisis. As a 
moral accountant of modernity, he was interested not only in its spiritual 
costs but also in its material dimensions, its social and political problems. 
Such is the case despite his many protests and claims that he was no re­
former, that he offered not a single proposal for »external« change. (SV 
XII, 436-44) Kierkegaard sought to provide a phenomenology of the in­
dividual’s experience of the world, others and self and this from a critical 
Christian point of view. However, he refused to allow his Christian pre­
suppositions to intrude as easy dogmatic explanations. Rather he permitted 
a variety of values and possible resolutions to play themselves out in his 
pseudonymous books. His use of a Socratically informed »indirect commun­
ication« further contributed to a style and method which could be called 
»inductive«, in Peter Berger’s view, an anthropological theology which 
begins with and utilizes human experience in working towards a Christian 
understanding of existence in modern society. Perhaps no better example 
of such an approach (in addition to the pseudonymous writings) is Kierke­
gaard’s most explicitly ethical book, Works of Love. Here the human ex­
perience of love is built upon to depict the selfless love of neighbor called 
for by the Gospel. In a startingly affirmative approach, Kierkegaard identifies 
love as an a priori, a presupposition in the heart of God and of humankind. 
Love is the »sprout in the grain«, the ever present possibility of »fundamental 
healing« for the individual and society. (SV IX, 204-15)12
II. Against the »Market-Town« and the Age: Kierkegaard*s Social Criticism
Kierkegaard’s social psychology, particularly in his earlier writings, affirms 
the dialectical relationship of self to society. As we have also seen, his 
orientation was as probing and critical as it was affirmative and sensitive 
to the nuances of identity and consciousness. Kierkegaard could not consider 
the individual apart from his/her grounding or social-historical location. 
Judge William’s marital status, occupation, class location are integral shapers 
of his life views. So too for the young esthete and any of Kierkegaard’s
other characters. W ith his own skills and inspiration from the romantics, 
from Blicher and J. L. Heiberg and Fru Gyllembourg and other authors, 
Kierkegaard captured a gallery of scenes from everyday life in Biedemeier 
Copenhagen during the last years of Denmark’s »Golden Age«. The details 
of the parlor and dining room, the accents of conversation and the sermons 
in city churches, the Sunday outings along Langelinie, in Dyrehaven and 
Frederiksberg Have and Gribskov are not accidental touches of realism but 
crucial ingredients for Kierkegaard’s examination of his Denmark and thus 
also important components of his social thinking. (SV VI, 78-83, 87-181;
VII, 133-57, 404-45)13 His literary and dramatic interests, evident through­
out his pseudonymous writings and journals, are also evident in A  Literary 
Review.
In the first portion, Kierkegaard meticulously assesses Fru Gyllembourg’s 
Two Ages. Her Story of Everyday Life had captured Copenhagen’s reading 
public and Kierkegaard indicated his appreciation of both her technical 
abilities and social-moral criticism. He took Gyllembourg’s depiction of the 
collision and contrast between the 18th century’s revolutionary spirit and the 
conservatism of the mid-19th century as a point of departure for his own
polemics. Some of his most familiar social criticism is drilled out h e re ----
his condemnation of the lack of passion and individuality in modernity, his 
identification of the mass-movement character of modern politics, the pand­
ering to a nebulous »public« by the press, the »leveling« of authority and 
traditional institutions, relationships and values. He also singled out modern­
ity’s ethical ambiguity, superficiality and hyperreflectivity for attack. (SV
VIII, 57-105) To be sure, Kierkegaard’s position here and in many other 
journal entries and published works up until the late 1840’s was fairly 
conservative. Nordentoft makes such a judgement but as he, Slok and 
Kirmmse also argue, Kierkegaard was hardly a pure, consistent conserva­
tive.!^ Rather, his stance was ambivalent, paradoxically mixed, shifting, 
consistent only in its dissent from other available viewpoints. His argument 
was not so much that the present age had gone too far but that it had not 
gone far enough. Compared with the profound transformations of the 18th 
century throughout Europe and at home in Denmark, those of the 19th 
century looked pale and mediocre indeed. Toward the conclusion of A  
Literary Review Kierkegaard’s tone shifts. Perhaps modernity’s chaos could 
be a purgative force after all, its emptiness exactly the impulse for individuals
to develop ethical and religious independence. These final pages reveal 
both the ambivalence and complexity of Kierkegaard’s criticism in the late 
1840’s and beyond. It was in ferment.
So too was Denmark in 1848-49. In the years from 1848-55, Kierke­
gaard’s journals dwarf the material published and in them can be traced 
a gradual but fundamental shift in his thinking. 15 While Kierkegaard was 
silent, as Slok has observed, a veritable ocean of writing flowed into the 
thousands of journal pages. About some subjects he droned on almost ad 
nauseam: Mynster, Martensen, Corsaren, Regine. Although dealt with in a 
similarly repetitious manner, other concerns were more significant: his deeper 
understanding of the radical pattern of Jesus’ life and the New Testament 
call to a discipleship of imitation, the proclamation of the Gospel for the 
poor, the sick and the suffering over against the Danish Church and 
society and the emergence of the common people in modernizing Danish 
society.16 It is not just the consensus of Bukdahl, Lindhardt, Nordentoft, 
Kirmmse, Slok, Deuser and myself that in the last years of his life Kierke­
gaard’s thinking changed and came to revolve around these issues. His 
journals as well as published works confirm it. (SV XII, 154-235, 308-37, 
402-19, 457-75)
The emergent common man class and the church-state synthesis formed 
the immediate social structural objects of Kierkegaard’s concentration. These 
two had clashed almost continuously from the beginning of the century in 
the Awakening movements (Vcekkelser) and gradually in more explicitly 
political contexts. 17 Conflicts between the state-church clergy’s more ration­
alist theology and preaching and the pietism/orthodoxy of rural farmers, city 
workers and servants and some intellectuals errupted in the 1820’s and 
1830’s. At times these involved clashes between particular pastors and their 
congregations but also more widespread conflict such as lay rejection of 
Bishop Balle’s new catechism and hymnal, Grundtvig’s attack on H. N. 
Clausen, and legal action against laity who persisted in holding prayer and 
preaching meetings despite a 1741 statute banning such activities outside 
the state-church’s control. Later conflict included the aftermath of Grundtvig’s 
attack, the polemics of J. C. Lindberg, A. G. Rudelbach and others in oppos­
ition to theological and liturgical distortions by state-church clergy and the 
increased activity of lay preachers such as Rasmus Sorensen and Rasmus 
Ottesen. Still later such conflict also came to touch upon the loosening of
parish bonds for baptism and confirmation, liturgical freedom for the clergy, 
and the possibility of laity forming a congregation and calling a pastor.
Kierkegaard was directly acquainted with some of these ecclesiastical 
conflicts through his father’s membership in the Copenhagen Herrnhutterite 
congregation and through his brother Peter Christian’s friendship with 
Grundtvig. The Rudelbach sisters’ correspondence and Peter Christian’s 
journals attest to at least minimal contact. Although it is difficult to prove 
any direct influence of this ecclesiastical turmoil on Kierkegaard it is never­
theless important to recognize his location in this period of social and reli­
gious upheaval. In this light, Kierkegaard’s own growing theological and 
social criticism in the years after 1848, culminating in the public attack on 
the Danish church and society in 1854-55, does not seem so singular an 
aberration but rather an action with the pattern of some forty years of 
precedent conflict before it. 18
It should also be noted that the tradition of church conflict in which 
Kierkegaard found himself was not only theological in nature. Research 
by Danish ecclesiastical historians in the past thirty years has examined the 
complex social, economic and political roots and significance of the Awaken­
ing and Grundtvigian movements. 19 Among the factors involved were the 
land and school reforms in the last years of the 18th and the first decades 
of the 19th centuries which rapidly transformed the lives of the lower class. 
There was also the economic depression, loss of ships and territory following 
Denmark’s devastation in the Napoleonic conflicts. Later came recovery and 
once again economic downspin in the late 1840’s, along with the swift 
political transformation of 1848-49 in which absolutism gave way to consti­
tutional democracy. 20 Throughout this period, despite the accomplishments 
of the Golden Age luminaries, the rising group in Danish society was the 
no longer silent majority, namely the small landowners, tenant farmers, 
workers and craftsmen and others gathered under the label of »common 
people«. As these became more literate and economically established they 
also became more religiously and politically independent. 21 The state-church
and its clergy---- Copenhagen-educated civil servants as well as spiritual
functionaries---- not only symbolized the authoritarian-hierarchical social
structure of absolutism. They were, with notable exceptions such as those 
linked to the Awakening and Grundtvigian movements, the last to relinquish 
support for the old political-religious synthesis, especially those influenced
by My ns ter’s policies during his long episcopate, 1834-54. Yet despite re­
sistance to change under Frederik VI and Christian VIII, the transformation 
of both church and society began.22
Against this background it is possible to see Kierkegaard’s growing criti­
cism in the years 1848-55 as more than a purely theological debate or 
ecclesiastical squabble. He drew his weapons from a powerful arsenal: the 
Gospel’s stark requirements and the figure of the crucified Christ. The 
suffering servant Jesus, the apostles and martyrs of the early church, all 
are contrasted with the state-church’s well educated, respectable, decently 
paid pastors. (Pap. X 1 A 135; X 2 A 27; SV XII, 161-7, 185-235; XIV, 
217-25, 257-72, 314, 325-6, 356)23 Christ is presented by Kierkegaard as 
the »prototype«, the pattern to be imitated, not the gentle Savior-Friend nor 
the glorified risen Lord but the despised, repulsive man of sorrows. (SV 
XII, 29-65, 81-134, 182-5, 206-31; Pap. X 1 A 154; X 2 A 30, 361; X 3 
A 409) Christ's life of proclamation and service, his love for the poor and
the suffering, finally his own horrible suffering and dea th ---- all this is
juxtaposed with the velvet and silk-robed, royally decorated clergy, especially 
with Mynster as the paradigm of social prestige and political shrewdness. 
(SV XIV, 55-75, 104-13, 117-23, 159-60, 234-58; Pap. X 2 A 418) On the 
one hand, crucifixion and suffering, on the other sonorous organ peals and 
eloquence during the »quiet hours« of worship in magnificently appointed 
churches. Kierkegaard’s criticism was not merely a bookish battle launched 
on the many writing desks in his apartment or from the pages of his library. 
It flew out through Copenhagen’s stately churches, cozy parlors and cafés; 
out past the city walls to the cottages of the peasants and within to the 
crammed quarters of the urban poor. It was not just a grappling with the 
ghosts of Hegel and Mynster but a one-man war against his church and 
society. Kierkegaard aimed at the church and then at the social order in 
which this church was established and which the church in turn supported. 
Slowly but inexorably Kierkegaard’s theological and social criticism converged 
and became inseparable.
III. Kierkegaard at the End
It is not an exaggeration to observe that the late Kierkegaard’s thinking 
and writing is provocative, important and, at the same time, perplexing. The
task of interpreting the late Kierkegaard has plagued scholarship for decades. 
The later writings are formidable in volume and forbidding in substance. 
The journals, in particular, are an overgrown jungle of repeated themes, 
shifts, experiments, contradictions and uncertainty. Then there is the over­
whelming negativity of these later writings: Kierkegaard’s obsession with 
Christianity’s hostility to human life, with suffering as the only mark of 
authentic discipleship. (SV XIV, 56-60, 117, 141-9, 181-93, 200-2, 211- 
17, 244-51, 254-64, 294-302, 333-6) Lindhardt has concluded that Kierke­
gaard comes close to a one-sided, rigid reading of the New Testament, a 
distorted picture of Christ and Sløk also admits as much, noting that the 
finely nuanced dialectics of the earlier authorship are gone in the late writ­
ings. 2 4 Kierkegaard, he suggests, lost the ability to express how Christianity 
could be lived, day in and day out. Nordentoft too points to the excesses 
of Kierkegaard’s negativity, his misogyny and ridicule of human love, friend­
ship, sexuality and parenthood. 2 5
The problems of the late Kierkegaard’s writings far surpass the limitations 
of analysis which must be imposed here. Beyond the difficulties of the texts 
themselves is the thicket of literature which has grown up around them, 
scholarship which all too often seeks either to defend »Saint Søren« and 
explain away the excesses or which all too easily dismisses the late Kierke­
gaard as a disturbed mind. Yet no assessment of Kierkegaard would be 
complete or valid without rigorous examination of these later years when 
his theological and social criticism merged. Recently, as noted here, the 
late years have become the focus of some of the best Kierkegaard scholar­
ship and deservedly so. It is not so much because these late years reflect 
the disintegration of a brilliant mind that we should pay more attention to 
them but because they were, in an important sense, the culmination of a 
life’s work. I would argue that we have spent comparatively too much time 
on the earlier Kierkegaard and thus comparatively too little time trying to 
understand his later thinking. Further, the late Kierkegaard deserves to be 
taken seriously in an increasingly secular, even allegedly post-Christian era 
such as ours. This is not just because Kierkegaard’s offensive against institu­
tional Christianity opened the doors to the later break in Denmark’s Christ- 
ianity-culture synthesis or because Kierkegaard paved the way for further 
radical challenges to faith and practice. All of which would have happened 
without him. No, the reasons for the late Kierkegaard’s significance inhere
more in the fact that his criticism came not from outside but from within the 
community of faith, not from one who had rejected Christianity and attacked 
from without, like Feuerbach or Nietzsche, but one who acted as an internal 
traitor, a Christian subversive. (Pap. X  2 A 163)
Kierkegaard rediscovered that the Gospel, while incommensurable with 
this or that particular social order or ideology, was not so transcendent as 
to completely part ways with history and society. Put differently, he came 
to recognize that Christian faith was inseparable from praxis, from the 
works of love for the neighbor here and now. He came to see that the 
Gospel’s stance was one of prophetic witness against the social order. This 
more negative posture, a modern theology of the cross, is most easily read 
in the late Kierkegaard’s concentration on the pattern of the suffering 
servant Christ and his ministry to the poor, the sick, the suffering, in short 
to the anawim, the little ones of Yahweh. The good news is proclaimed 
for them and for us who will not see them and come to their aid as fellows 
in suffering. Kierkegaard’s condemnation fell most heavily on those who 
viewed the suffering with contempt, ignored them or tried to forget their 
pain in a contorted version of Christianity. (Pap. X 1 A 2, 135, 269, 644, 
669; X 2 A 48, 55; X  3 A 48; X 4 A 578) It is no exaggeration to sense in 
Kierkegaard’s paradoxical Christ, the symbol of impotence in suffering and 
death, a resonance with the vision of contemporary theologians in the Third 
World.26 It may be precisely a theologia crucis that the church needs to 
rediscover in the last years of the 20th century when the Christendom Kierke­
gaard attacked has long since vanished. I do not mean that Kierkegaard 
offers all we need but simply that there is much to rediscover in his focus 
on the suffering servant Christ, on imitation, performing the works of love 
and standing in witness against the social structures and ideologies, right 
or left, that oppress and enslave.
Of course there has been much debate about the late Kierkegaard. His 
own contemporaries were of the opinion that the theology of the public 
attack was indecorous, unbiblical, a return to »monkish« works-justification, 
very possibly the product of a disturbed mind.27 As noted here, subsequent 
generations of scholars have also struggled with the late Kierkegaard, often 
arriving at some of the same conclusions. Such verdicts are understandable, 
as both Nordentoft and Slok observe, given the overwhelming negativity of 
the later writings. Although I cannot fully describe and analyze it here, I
would argue that there was another side to this negativity, an affirmative 
point of view which was not only parallel to the harsh perspectives made 
explicit but which Kierkegaard assumed as fundamental to authentic under­
standing and practice of Christianity. Elsewhere I have called this positive 
dimension Kierkegaard’s »incarnational optimism« because it was rooted 
in his realization of God’s continual mercy and presence for humankind in 
Christ. 2 8 I would not claim that this »other side« is a direct continuation 
of Kierkegaard’s earlier thinking but a result of his post-1848 transformation 
just as much as the more obvious negativity of the later years. Likewise 
I cannot claim that this more affirmative perspective rescued Kierkegaard 
from the fanaticism of the late period. Contra Logstrup, I would simply 
suggest that it is important to listen to what Kierkegaard »also said«, i.e. 
what is there alongside, even beneath the negativity, obscured for the most 
part, perhaps even intentionally, dialectically by Kierkegaard himself. This 
»incarnational optimism« can be glimpsed in places far too numerous to 
catalogue here. For example it very clearly surfaces in the Christian Dis­
courses' view of the always available gift of grace. (SV X, 101-52, 190-204, 
264-71, 295-309) One can remember it from Works of Love (SV IX, 44ff., 
72, 185-6, 204-30, 295-8, 344-57) and hear it sporadically but forcefully 
in the journals. (Pap. VIII 1 A 640-9; X  1 A 246, 279; X 6 B 241) Christ 
is the prototype but also the gift, the merciful savior. 2 9 And lastly there 
is the conspicuous positioning of the sermon, »God’s Unchangeableness« 
towards the end of the public attack on August 1, 1855. (SV XIV, 277-94) 
Here Kierkegaard directly emphasizes the permanence of God’s presence 
and love in counterpoint to the rigor and suffering of Christianity otherwise 
stressed in the public attack literature. All the condemnation of this literature 
notwithstanding, Kierkegaard still points to the »Father of lights«, the 
giver of every good and perfect gift. Here, in my opinion, Kierkegaard 
brings suffering and grace together, making the point Bonhoeffer was to 
proclaim from his prison cell a century later, that the cross and the res­
urrection are inseparable, that there can be no grace without suffering. 30 
In short, even in the middle of his public attack Kierkegaard did not 
completely forget the grounding of creation, of the human creature in the 
creator and God’s continual invitation of conversion and reconciliation to 
fallen creation, in the Incarnation, in Jesus of Nazareth.
So we conclude as we began with Christian proclamation and anthro-
pological contemplation. Kierkegaard’s work in plotting out the pilgrimage 
of faith was also a pilgrimage of human consciousness and experience. Put 
differently, Kierkegaard’s understanding of the Gospel required inspection 
and criticism of history and society. Kierkegaard, at the end and in the end 
is both a theologian and a social thinker. I would argue that for him the 
roles were inseparable. We do well to remember, in this regard, Kierke­
gaard’s rejection of Christianity as mere doctrine or ecclesiastical structure 
and function. The Gospel, for him, was, as for the earliest disciples, »the 
and function. The Gospel, for him, was, as for the earliest disciples, »the 
everyday life of the disciple, a life which trails through history and society 
towards eternity.
In conclusion then, we should not be surprised that Kierkegaard bears 
little resemblance to most contemporary social theorists and critics or to 
professional theologians for that matter. He was, of course, very much a 
child of his age, of a time when theology had not been so definitively 
differentiated from social thought. We need only think of Hegel in this 
respect or of earlier figures such as Augustine and Luther, or, dare I say 
it, of the theology which persisted even in Marx’s »scientific« dialectical 
materialism. Only in our century is it difficult to imagine theology and 
social thought as intimately related, even fused in the thought of one 
individual. Yet this is precisely how we must understand Kierkegaard’s 
enterprise of Christian proclamation and anthropological contemplation. 
Perhaps we will not find the variety of theories or sophistication of measure­
ment that we do in modern social science. Yet as Robert Nisbet has so 
eloquently put it, we will find that the creation of sociological portraits and 
landscapes was important for Kierkegaard, not only in serving the eternal 
but in its own right. 31
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